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INTRODUCTION 
The World Bank (2018b) states that two billion people live in countries where development 
outcomes are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, and that by 2030, the share of global 
poor living in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) is projected to reach nearly 50%. 
Furthermore, conflicts drive 80% of all humanitarian needs. It warns (p.1) that fragility and 
conflict is ‘a critical development challenge that threatens efforts to end extreme poverty, 
affecting both low- and middle-income countries’ and that ‘the fragility landscape is becoming 
more complex.’ Whilst the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide an ambitious set of 
development goals to be achieved by 2030 (Pogge & Sengupta, 2015), a subset of FCAS face 
particularly severe challenges in meeting these goals. SDG 16 explicitly targets peace, justice 
and strong institutions, and aims to significantly reduce all forms of violence, and work with 
governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity. Yet such 
ambitions stand in contrast to the evidence that conflict and fragility are systemically associated 
with conditions of underdevelopment (Cilliers & Sisk 2013). Such evidence emphasizes the 
interconnection between the SDGs individual goals and, therefore, the importance of systems 
thinking and approaches to achieve them. 
Our objective is to advance understanding of the nexus between business environment 
reforms (BER) and SDG 16 mindful of the interconnections between conflict, fragility, and 
underdevelopment. We examine the evidence and the lessons of BER in FCAS, based on the 
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experience of four African countries (Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Ethiopia) that have or 
are transitioning from a fragile environment to greater stability and more sustained economic 
growth. We develop a systems approach rather than a transactional approach to recognize the 
complex network of interconnected and interacting business interests, agendas, and systems in 
FCAS. Given the complexity of FCAS we are aware that our study is exploratory in nature but it 
raises important implications for the role of business in such contexts. 
The SDGs are structured around a partner-centred approach with an explicit role for 
business involvement and this provides a challenge for the international business agenda. But 
van Zanten and van Tulder (2018: 208) caution that ‘extant international business research hardly 
covers the private sector’s role in achieving international policy goals.’ They also state the SDGs 
cannot be achieved without the contributions of multinational enterprises (MNEs), and indeed 
business enterprise more generally. Kolk, Rivera-Santos, and Rufín (2018) highlight the different 
impacts of business activity on underdevelopment and suggest that the relationship is still 
unclear but important. For many developing countries, a key component for achieving these 
goals will be the expansion of the business sector, both indigenous and multinational, and this 
has gone hand-in-hand with extensive BER aimed at lowering transaction costs and making 
institutional environments more attractive to enterprises. Donor agencies and multilateral 
financial institutions have promoted BER as a key component for the future development 
strategies of FCAS (Gates et al., 2012). Such reforms are rooted in policy assumptions about the 
positive role of the private sector in transitions from fragility to peaceful development. If the 
mere presence and operation of ethical businesses is peace and development positive – identified 
as a preeminent thrust of the business and peace literature (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Oetzel, 
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Westermann-Behaylo, Koerber, Fort, & Rivera, 2010) – then by extension BER that results in 
market development and increased investment will advance achievement of the SDGs. 
Yet the assumption of a linear relationship between private sector promotion through 
BER and advancement of the SDGs in FCAS is put into question by research. Qualitative 
analysis from any number of fragile states (e.g., Afghanistan: DuPée, 2012; Nigeria: Idemudia, 
2010; Colombia: Dunning & Wirpsa, 2004), shows how business operations may even prolong 
or exacerbate conflict, notwithstanding explicit ambitions to bring a ‘development dividend’ to 
local populations (Miklian, Schouten, & Ganson, 2016). A key dynamic is the intensification of 
competition between groups or actors in conflict through the introduction of new resources 
(Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009), meaning that private sector promotion may as easily undermine 
peaceful development as support it (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016). 
The article is structured as follows. The next section examines how BER has been 
positioned to address the interconnections between the private sector expansion, economic 
development, and peacebuilding. This is followed by a systems-based critique of linear 
approaches to BER, founded in peacebuilding and complexity theory. The research methodology 
outlines the use of our qualitative case study approach that draws on several data sources to 
inform its analysis, including one-on-one interviews and focus groups. The country findings 
follow and thereafter we discuss the key themes which emerge from the country case studies. 
The conclusion proposes a systems-based framework which incorporates BER. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Business Environment Reforms in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States 
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We understand FCAS as states or regions ‘that suffer external and social stresses that are 
particularly likely to result in violence; lack the capacity to manage conflict without violence; 
and neighbour states that are especially susceptible to instability’ (DFID, 2015). These states 
often exhibit capacity gaps (in terms of their provision of core public goods), security gaps (in 
terms of the prevalence of conflict), and legitimacy gaps (which gauges whether the regime’s 
rules and/or processes are sufficiently transparent and accountable to permit popular free 
expression and participation) (Call, 2010: 304). 
Since 2000, the average growth per capita for FCAS of 1.19% per annum is below that of 
low- and middle-income countries (the group to which almost all FCAS fall into) (World Bank, 
2018a). Perhaps more telling is the high level of volatility associated with this growth; its 
standard deviation of 4.59 is more than three times that of the world average or that of LICs 
(calculated using World Bank data, 2018a). This indicates the high level of vulnerability these 
economies face with the consequential effects on their populations and their livelihoods.  
Such poor economic performance is also reflected with respect to progress towards achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals, where on an aggregate scale about two-thirds of these states 
did not achieved a primary Millennium Development Goal of cutting poverty by half (OECD, 
2015: 13). These dynamics will remain important as FCAS and their international partners are 
gearing up to achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.  
Given the assumption that a robust private sector has a critical role to play in 
development, many bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and institutions focus on 
transforming business environments as a way of supporting the development of a private sector 
(Fisher, 2015; Molenaers et al., 2015). At its core, BER is about reducing the transaction costs of 
doing business, decreasing risks, and providing greater levels of certainty as regards the quality 
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and stability of government policies, laws and regulations so as to increase investments, and to 
raise competitive pressures by reducing entry barriers and stimulating levels of efficiency and 
innovation (DCED, 2008). BER programmes have been premised upon several causal links 
about making markets work for the poor by harnessing the power of the private sector through 
increased investment, leading to higher economic growth and employment, a reduction in 
poverty and ultimately conflict (White & Fortune, 2015: 5-6). The evidence supporting these 
causal links, however, is not uncontested, and different dimensions find stronger support than 
others (Berman et al., 2011; Blair et al., 2012; Chibba & Luiz, 2019; Stewart, 2008).  
Within FCAS it adds the additional premises that BER not only affects firm behaviour 
and economic outcomes, but also peace and security in these fragile environments – all within 
the particular challenging contexts of FCAS. Collier (2010) highlights the importance of 
economic recovery as vital to stability in FCAS. He finds that the lower the income, the higher 
the risk of conflict reversion, and the slower the economic recovery the more likely a reversion to 
violence (Manuel, 2015: 13). BER in FCAS programmes therefore aim to address the overall 
obstacles to growth that arise in countries emerging from conflict. They aim to create the 
conditions that promote private sector development, and that can lead to increased job creation, 
formalisation of economic activity and therefore tax revenues, and, presumably, lower poverty 
rates and strengthening of the state-society bond. 
A Systems-Based Approach to Peacebuilding and Development 
BER is premised upon a linear, deterministic model or theory of change approach to conflict 
resolution and development. BER is presumed to have impacts on markets that positively impact 
human development (for example, livelihoods, access to public and private services etc.), which 
in turn reduce conflict in the political economy. This line of thinking is also aligned with the 
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hypothesis of the dominant peacebuilding theory in the liberal era which argues that ‘societies 
will achieve sustainable peace when their norms and institutions reflect and maintain multi-party 
democracy [and] and a free-market economy’ (De Coning, 2018: 302). This ‘deterministic- 
design model’ saw peace and development as a guaranteed outcome if the design was followed 
(see also Ladley & Wennmann, 2019). 
The conflict resolution literature has shifted away from this model and an alternative of 
‘adaptive peacebuilding’ is emerging. This approach is embedded in complexity theory as 
applied to the social world (Fisher & Rucki, 2017). De Coning (2018: 305) explains that this 
theory posits that social systems are highly dynamic, non-linear and emergent: ‘Complex 
systems cope with challenges posed by changes in their environment through co-evolving 
together with their environment in a never-ending process of adaptation. This iterative adaptive 
process uses experimentation and feedback to generate knowledge about the system’s 
environment. It is this process, inherent in the behaviour of all complex systems, which the 
adaptive peacebuilding approach seeks to replicate and modulate’.  Recognising that uncertainty 
is an intrinsic quality of complex systems requires a move away from ‘determined-design 
assumptions’ and accepting processes of emergence and the ‘complex, multilevel, dynamic’ 
attributes of conflict (p. 310, 314). This approach ‘aims to work with the constructive attributes 
of change by investing in the resilience of social institutions and thereby helping them to cope 
with and channel change positively’ (De Coning, 2018: 305).  
Such a systems approach is aligned with the work on macromarkets which has moved 
away from transactional to systems approaches (Layton, 2007, 2009; Redmond, 2018). This 
research recognises that economic growth is not merely a technical function of savings and 
investment but that we need to be mindful of the marketing systems and how they are adapted to 
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the environment in which they operate and demonstrate resilience or responsiveness. Growth and 
development are affected by marketing systems that are ‘multilayered, multiagent, 
multiparticipatory’ in structure (Layton, 2009: 355). In less-developed settings ‘markets often 
have entrenched, systemic issues that are resistant to piecemeal interventions’ (Schultz et al., 
2012:182) requiring an emergent systems approach to development. This line of macromarketing 
analysis has been applied to an analysis of conflict and economies in transition recognising the 
role of markets in the peace process (Shultz, Burkink, Grbac, & Renko, 2005; Shultz & Pecotich, 
1997). Applying this thinking to the Bosnian conflict and post-war development Sredl, Shultz, 
and Brečić (2017: 300) conclude that ‘marketing systems are not merely random artefacts of 
human behavior; rather, they are adaptive, purposeful, can be pernicious and/or provisioning, and 
ultimately … must be well integrated into other prosocial systems to affect the best possible 
outcomes for all stakeholders. By engaging with a marketing system in a post-conflict, divided 
society, we are better able to understand the genesis and evolution of markets and marketing 
systems; the relationships among war economy, peace accords, and the ways that post-war 
marketing systems create community, provide for community needs, and create new 
vulnerabilities for some community members.’ 
We thus have two very different approaches to BER and its implications for conflict 
resolution and development - one premised on a linear, deterministic model and the other rooted 
in complexity, emergence, and systems-thinking. Given our research objective of understanding 
the nexus between BER and conflict, fragility, and underdevelopment, we examine how these 




Given the research objective being embedded in real-world problems and the importance of 
analysing the complex context in which our research takes place, the research lent itself to a 
pragmatist interpretive framework and a qualitative case study approach (Creswell & Poth, 
2018). It examines four countries that have explicitly focused on BER and that are transitioning 
from conditions of conflict and fragility, namely Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Ethiopia. 
We wanted to concentrate on African countries given the dearth of research from an international 
business policy perspective on the continent, and because of the particular importance of 
promoting development and peace in this region. 
The study draws on several data sources to inform its analysis, including one-on-one 
interviews, roundtable focus groups, and an analysis of documents, reports, and data. Between 
February and April 2017, the study team deepened evidence from the extensive literature review 
of FCAS in these countries, through semi-structured interviews with 42 individuals actively 
involved in BER in these countries, including country experts, investors, policymakers, civil 
society, and researchers working across sectors and geographical areas. Interviews were 
conducted in person or via Skype and lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. Thereafter in May and 
June 2017, expert roundtables were held in London, Freetown, and Kampala which convened a 
total of 41 participants to analyse and provide expert input on preliminary findings. Those 
roundtables lasted four to five hours each. The roundtables were conducted after the first round 
of interviews and once we had undertaken the initial coding of those interviews. The aim of these 
roundtables was to provide expert input on our preliminary findings to further assist us in the 
coding process and in enhancing the credibility of our findings. This is in line with Creswell and 
Poth (2018) who suggest that such focus groups are also advantageous to elicit more heated and 
open exchanges as a result of the interaction amongst participants. The roundtable in London was 
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the final workshop where we presented our initial findings to development and conflict 
resolution experts from academia, civil society, and policymakers. This allowed for further input 
and the final closing of the loop in terms of our methodology. 
A total of 83 respondents therefore participated in our research as outlined in table 1. The 
study utilized a dual approach to sampling. Purposive sampling was used to select individuals 
who could purposefully inform our research question based upon their experience and 
knowledge of BER in the affected countries. This led to snowballing techniques whereby they 
recommended additional people who could enrich our cases.  
Insert table 1 here 
The interviews and workshops were guided by a protocol to harmonise primary data collection 
across the study and to support the documentation of data and narratives. Interviews were 
transcribed, analysed, and coded thematically. The themes that emerged included the varied 
motivations for pursuing BER and whether the reforms were internationally or locally catalysed, 
the level of participation or lack thereof in the analysis and design of reforms, the contested 
nature of BER and how it fitted fit into other social and political processes underway in the same 
period, the problems associated with implementation and sequencing of reforms, and the impact 
of BER both intended and unintended. 
The validation and reliability of our research was supported through various strategies. 
Corroborating evidence through triangulation was provided through the use of multiple data 
sources including country reports, policy documents, academic literature, econometric studies, 
and secondary economic data. Member checking was achieved through several techniques 
including making the transcripts available to respondents for verification, and in engaging with 
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them regarding the interpretations and conclusions of the study. Furthermore, the roundtables 
were specifically structured to engage the participants more actively in the process of reaching 
conclusions and asking them to reflect on our analysis. Towards the end of the research process, 
the results were presented for feedback in various forums including with stakeholders in the BER 
policy environment. In addition, the data were collected in such a way as to enable external 
audits of both the processes and the data itself (through transcription) which enhanced the 
reliability. We adopted the procedures for reliability of intercoder agreement as suggested by 
Creswell and Poth (2018): we established a common platform for coding amongst the 
researchers and the principal investigators met repeatedly to examine the codes and to ensure 
their consistent application and to crosscheck each other’s coding.  
COUNTRY FINDINGS 
The four countries differ substantially across a variety of dimensions. Politically, Ethiopia is a 
federal state explicitly recognizing its ethno-linguistic diversity, while the other countries 
downplay ethno-linguistic differences in pursuit of a unified nation state. Ethiopia and Rwanda 
have been highly effective in using laws and formal state institutions as tools for implementing 
state policies, while Uganda and Sierra Leone represent states where the formal system rarely 
describes how decisions are actually made or implemented. Ethiopia’s current reform path can be 
traced back to 1992 and Rwanda’s to 1994, while Sierra Leone’s started more recently in 2002 
and Uganda’s in 2006 following transitions out of acute conflict in each country.  
Table 2 presents comparative socio-economic data on our four country case studies. By 
the numbers, Ethiopia’s population is nearly 100 million but Sierra Leone’s only 6.5 million, and 
the size of the economies vary likewise from $73 billion to $3.5 billion respectively. Whilst 
agriculture accounts for 71% of GDP in Sierra Leone, but only 25% in Uganda. All four 
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countries demonstrate considerable differences and dualities between urban and rural areas. 
These differences make the substantial congruity of the findings with respect to BER 
effectiveness and ineffectiveness across the four countries all the more important. It suggests that 
the dynamics of FCAS BER are deeply rooted in socio-political factors that cut across even quite 
different FCAS countries, linking insights on FCAS BER to emerging understandings of fragility 
and state-building more generally. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Rwanda 
Very few countries in modern history have targeted BER as systematically and explicitly as 
Rwanda has since the genocide of 1994. There is substantial evidence that it has successfully 
reduced the transaction costs of doing business and made the business environment more 
attractive (World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, interviewees for this country study generally 
associate BER with the country’s rapidly improving macroeconomic trends as well as with 
progress against development indicators such as literacy rates, life expectancy, health outcomes, 
access to basic services, and declining poverty rates, reflecting the real progress experienced by 
broad segments of the population (World Bank, 2018a). The line of reasoning is further extended 
to argue that the growing economy and economic opportunities contributed towards higher levels 
of stability:  
‘There is a clear link between BER and peace. 1994 happened partly as a result of a lack 
of leadership and policy. The right policy creates the right socio-economic conditions 
and this requires the right leadership and BER is an important component thereof. BER 
creates jobs which then reinforces the process of peace building’ (Respondent 3). 
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‘It has had a positive impact on every facet. It has enhanced growth, and developed the 
private sector. By developing the private sector it has promoted employment, and taxes to 
the government which has resulted in good public services. It is also promoted security 
because more people now have a stake in the economy and have an interest in making it 
work’ (Respondent 7). 
As such, BER is subsidiary to, and part and parcel of, a broader strategy of mobilizing the state 
to plan and implement the country’s economic transformation and exit from fragility. Political 
elites were willing and able to impose high levels of urgency and discipline on different state 
organs.  
Institution-building initially focused on security and justice, and the provision of basic needs, 
as the ruling party’s legitimacy and popular support was closely tied to a well-functioning state 
and the delivery of economic outcomes. It then turned to the construction of more advanced 
institutions required to implement more ambitious – in terms of scale and complexity – economic 
plans. These were in turn enabled by the previous large-scale social upheaval that disrupted 
traditional sources of power and vested interests, making radical planning possible. 
Rwanda made economic and social progress in part by setting ambitious administrative 
targets and monitoring them carefully, and sound BER policy was an integral part of this 
executional excellence. BER succeeded as one element of a broader political strategy of the 
government. The country’s Vision 2020 identifies six interwoven pillars, including good 
governance and an efficient state, skilled human capital, a vibrant private sector, world-class 
physical infrastructure, and modern agriculture and livestock, ‘all geared towards prospering in 
national, regional and global markets’ (RoR, 2012: i). It is premised not only on economic 
outcomes, but also the implicit link between economic progress and peace and stability.  
14 
 
There are likely limits, however, on what BER can deliver. Rwanda’s impressive growth 
comes from a very low base. World Bank data (2018a) suggest that its GDP per capita was USD 
313 in 1993 falling to USD 126 after the genocide in 1994. Rwanda’s small market size and 
geographical disadvantages have acted as a constraint in terms of attracting FDI and economic 
diversification. Rwanda remains highly dependent on foreign assistance, with 30-40% of the 
budget still coming from aid. 70% of the population still relies on subsistence agriculture 
(including roughly 85% of women), and over 63% live in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2018a). 
It is unclear how its largely state-coordinated economy can supply better livelihoods for the large 
majority of its population currently engaged in subsistence farming.  
Questions also remain as to the sustainability of the Rwanda experience, particularly in light 
of the patrimonial and authoritarian nature of the government. BER has disproportionately 
advantaged the RPF and the military, which own or control a disproportionate percentage of the 
Rwandan formal economy (Mann & Berry, 2016). This was explicitly raised by both respondents 
two and eight. It was asserted that, in the early phases of economic development, these state 
actors were required to fill economic voids. But this raises questions of when and how they 
withdraw; how they engage with new private sector participants (particularly those that threaten 
their dominance); the extent to which they are crowding out private sector investment; and the 
extent to which they serve primarily to consolidate patrimonial control. 
Additionally, as a relatively small elite consolidates economic and political power, it is 
unclear by which mechanisms the government can or will be held to popular account for 
development outcomes in the future. To the extent that the broader and deeper economic 
development will also require commensurate increases in social and political freedoms, it is 
unclear whether the ruling elite has the willingness or capacity to implement such reforms. As 
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one respondent noted with concern, ‘civil society has been marginalised and continues to be 
marginalised, and in fact the RPF has become less tolerant. BER has reinforced existing systems 
of power and perpetuated the dominance of the RPF’ (Respondent 2). This raises questions 
about how international businesses should structure their relationship with the government and if 
and how its participation in the economy could become an instrument for the achievement of 
SDGs, broad-based economic growth, and more inclusive politics. 
Uganda 
The election of President Museveni in multi-party elections in February 2006, followed by the 
signing of the truce between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
August, heralded a new era of hope for a more stable economic and political climate that would 
deliver peace and development for Ugandans. Over the course of a decade, a variety of high-
profile initiatives and institutions sought to reform the business environment in ways that 
supported the government’s vision for private sector-led development and the attraction of 
foreign investment. These included structural reforms; a policy of divestiture of state enterprises; 
and the establishment of the Uganda Investment Authority, the Presidential Economic Council, 
and the Presidential Investors’ Roundtable. 
The results of these efforts have been mixed at best. There have been some relatively 
clear successes, for example, the establishment of professionalised key economic institutions 
such as the central bank and ministry of finance. Where concerted investments have been made, 
some agencies have shown improvement in their administration of core functions, including the 
tax authority. Other initiatives transformed into political crises, including for instance 
‘infrastructure projects intended to increase market access that were so rife with corruption that 
they imperilled international assistance to the country’ (Respondent 14). 
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Some key insights of potentially general applicability that emerge from the Uganda case, 
based upon the roundtable discussions with participants 43 to 57 in a collaborative validation 
process (as outlined in Creswell & Poth, 2018: 262), include the following. First, the bigger 
picture of political change and economic transformation matters. The typical, largely technical 
measures of BER success (such as days required to register a business) may say little about the 
country’s trajectory out of fragility or towards development. The pertinent question is impact. 
How BER is (or is not) contributing to broader dynamics of conflict and development, and 
whether change is happening broadly enough and fast enough to meaningfully affect positive 
change within a fragile system: ‘until there is a genuine and sufficient consensus on the nature of 
the economic playing field and the broad rules of the game, BER is likely to remain a weak lever 
for growth, inclusive development, and stability’ (Respondent 12). 
Second, designers of BER programmes should be attentive to the informal sector. In a 
country in which over 50% of GDP and 80% of the labour force (World Bank, 2018a) are tied to 
the informal economy, the inter-relationship of BER to the informal sector requires more explicit 
attention. This has both potentially positive dimensions – e.g. the importance of international 
trade facilitation to smallholder farmers – and negative ones – e.g. the impact of large-scale 
agricultural promotion and oil development on land tenure and household economic security. 
Third, non-state interventions may be an easier entry point for genuine change. In Uganda, many 
state agencies remain in persistent crisis, such as the agricultural extension services that have 
been repeatedly reorganised. Often seeds and fertilizer on the market remain fraudulent or 
mislabelled due to lack of effective regulation. In such contexts, investment in donor- or NGO-
led initiatives to provide finance, enhance market access or increase smallholder productivity, for 
example, may provide higher returns on BER investment.  
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Fourth, islands of excellence can be developed within a difficult context (Leonard, 2010). 
Despite the chronically poor state of Ugandan governance as measured by most all indicators, 
islands of excellence – for example, the central bank – exist. These appear to be explained by 
elite consensus that certain core functions – including macro-economic stability and perhaps also 
tax collection – are indispensable even within a patronage-based political economy (Green, 
2008). This suggests the need to invest both in consensus-building as a foundation for effective 
reform, and to explore the possibilities for further investments in already-functioning institutions 
to broaden their scope and impact. However, this creates a perception that BER is mostly 
concerned with macroeconomic outcomes rather than meaningful development as articulated by 
respondent 13: ‘there is a growing sense that government’s primary motivations for BER are 
growth and tax revenues rather than genuine human development and broad based opportunity.’ 
Fifth, attention to potentially and actually negative impacts is required. The Ugandan 
experience suggests that BER efforts, including infrastructure development and trade promotion 
efforts, may be concentrated in already more developed areas, exacerbating inequality and 
exclusion. Reforms geared towards sectors deemed important from the national perspective may 
have very different impacts locally. Sixth, infrastructure can promote growth, but be a magnet for 
corruption (Green, 2008). The Ugandan experience suggests that the sizeable funds invested in 
infrastructure projects are often irresistible magnets for predation within the context of a 
patronage state and endemic corruption. On the other hand, this infrastructure, once built, 
provides important enablers of market access for a variety of formal and informal private sector 
actors, even in the absence of other functioning state institutions and services. Lastly, the reality 
is far more complex than often portrayed within BER. For example, many economic analyses 
maintain that the access to banking and credit is limited, and that such limits are hindering 
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economic growth (Otchere et al., 2016). The fundamental assumption in this narrative is that the 
people want to open bank accounts and gain access to finance, but the lack of technical capacity 
is preventing this from happening. In the case of Uganda, many individuals, and especially 
owners of small and medium enterprises, often do not want to open official bank accounts 
because they believe that the government will tax these accounts or use them to identify wealthy 
individuals to satisfy their predatory greed. In this context, mobile banking has become 
extraordinarily popular because it is anonymous and operates largely outside of governmental 
oversight. 
Ethiopia 
Following the end of the Eritrean war and a change in government, Ethiopia entered a first phase 
of notable (if relatively unstable) economic growth in 1992 as it transitioned from a command 
economy through the set of structural reforms supported by the Bretton Woods institutions that 
also opened the door to substantial international financial aid. Following the severe drought of 
2003/4, a sustained period of growth began. What makes the Ethiopian BER case distinctive is 
that the country did not prioritise private-sector liberalisation or BER in ways comparable to the 
other countries in this study. It is considered by the World Bank (2016) as a ‘laggard’ in 
structural reforms; with the exception of the trade reform index, Ethiopia falls below averages for 
low and lower middle income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, across most reform dimensions. 
The government under the banner of the ‘developmental state’ has remained highly 
interventionist in the economy, influencing lending, prioritising state-led development projects, 
and restricting foreign participation in key economic sectors. A fundamental foundation of this 
growth is public investment, notably in infrastructure and agricultural productivity.  
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The economy remains at risk to both external and internal shocks. Most agriculture is still 
rain-fed, rendering the economy’s largest sector, employer and source of household security 
prone to risks of drought; 80% of the population engages in subsistence farming, and as recently 
as 2010-2012 there was still a 40% prevalence of under-nutrition (UN, 2017). The country 
engaged in a border skirmish with Eritrea in 2016, and has intervened directly and indirectly in 
South Central Somalia. It is the world’s fifth largest refugee hosting country. More than 50% of 
the national budget is underwritten by foreign aid. Internally, the ruling party dominates state 
institutions, and its allies receive preferential access to credit, land leases, jobs and public-private 
partnership opportunities, fuelling social and political tensions. The state of emergency imposed 
in 2016 in the wake of increasingly violent civic unrest, along with heavy-handed government 
responses to political opposition (see HRW, 2017), have somewhat dampened foreign appetite 
for new investment.  
The government thus finds itself in a quandary. In an economy in which the 
manufacturing sector accounts for only 6% of GDP, dominated by food and beverage, textiles 
and apparel, and leather industries (World Bank, 2018a), the government’s espoused priority is 
industrialisation, and its policy documents acknowledge the ‘pivotal role’ of the private sector. 
Yet respondent 20 pointed out the contradictions that: 
There is little apparent progress towards joining the WTO, and a government typically 
committed to tight control seems loathe to address fundamentally questions of 
telecommunications, land acquisition, foreign exchange controls, transaction costs, 
institutional weaknesses, corruption, competition, access to ideas and information, or 
other issues critical to investor interest. The country does not appear to be on track to 
reach its aspiration of middle income country status by 2025. 
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Some key insights of potentially general applicability that emerge from the Ethiopian 
case include the following. First, BER for the informal sector is a priority if most people are to 
benefit. Ethiopia’s policy of agriculture-led industrial development includes a sustained focus on 
smallholder productivity. Complementary investments range from seed and fertilizer 
programmes, to finance mechanisms for micro- and small enterprises, to rural road development, 
to issuance of certificates formalising ‘holder rights’, to one of the world’s highest densities of 
agricultural extension agents (at least in the Highlands). This recognition that the rural poor are 
the largest cohort of the business community has supported not only economic growth, but a fall 
in the extreme poverty rate from 55.3% to just under 30% from 2000 to 2010 (UN, 2017).  
Second, small scale-mining can be significant for large numbers of people. The 137 
companies operating in the mining sector in Ethiopia are estimated to employ around 6,000 
people. The government estimates some 500,000 artisanal miners in the country, with five to 
seven million people depending on mining for their livelihoods (Ethiopian Investment Agency, 
2014). These numbers are considered by a study to be substantially underestimated, with more 
than 1.2 million artisanal miners identified in the gold and opal producing areas alone (Tadess, 
2016). The government has introduced some initiatives to address regulation, technical 
assistance, and market access, for example, but not at the scale, quality or level of commitment 
seen in the agricultural sector.  
Third, ongoing attentiveness to local conflict and developmental impacts is required. As 
recently as 2010, the ruling EPRDF recognised that ‘rapid development which benefits all 
sectors of the population is a survival question’ for the Ethiopian state. Yet ‘BER policies that 
are perceived as unfairly benefiting a minority, exacerbating inequality or undermining 
community rights are among the drivers of resurgent domestic unrest’ (Respondent 19). Ethiopia 
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experiences high levels of investment-induced displacement and conflict, often on land that the 
government has classified as ‘unused’ or ‘marginally used’ to ready it for ‘development’ or 
urban expansion. Respondent 19 highlighted that ‘tensions are also growing due to internal 
economic migration that alters the balance among identity groups, and potentially the political 
power in what has been designed as an ethno-federalist state.’ There seem to be few answers for 
those most directly and negatively affected by such growth policies.  
Lastly, the basis of a political consensus underpinning a period of stability is likely to 
change over time. In earlier years of Ethiopia’s development, the strong link between agriculture 
growth and poverty reduction provided a basis for consensus around reform policies, especially 
related to infrastructure and smallholder development. As the government aspires to migrate 
from strategies of improving yields within a primary production economy to an efficiency-driven 
economy capable of competitively producing advanced products and services, the nature and 
extent of the consensus – between the national government and the federal states, between 
government and civil society, and between formal and informal sources of power and authority – 
shifts in ways that are currently poorly managed.  
How businesses adapt their strategies and offerings in these sorts of environments is an 
important area for future research (Hart & Milstein, 2003) but also brings into question how its 
engagement can contribute towards the SDGs and connect formal and informal, and rural and 
urban sectors more effectively for inclusive development. Such research should receive 
increasing relevance after the 2018 peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea placed economic 




Since the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, a variety of actors explicitly link BER to reduced 
fragility and accelerated development. UNCTAD (2010) asserts that the country has made 
significant progress towards achieving peace and stability through reforms to attract foreign 
direct investment and promote private sector development. Yet these BER efforts do not appear 
to have addressed long-standing dynamics of conflict and fragility. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission found in its review of the causes of the civil war that, ‘from the outset of the post-
independence period, those in power plundered the state and its resources, putting self-
enrichment before any form of real development or accountability’ (SLTRC, 2004: 13) using 
business as the direct and indirect medium to perpetrate their plunder. Comparing the pre-civil 
war period with the contemporary period, our respondents argued that the role played by 
businesses has not changed substantially: 
‘Medium-sized businesses ‘win’ government bids, only to subcontract to professionals for 
a commission shared with public officials; large firms operating in the natural resources 
sector allow the extraction of considerable rents in return for waivers, concessions and 
lenient application of official regulations, making it difficult to separate state from 
private interests, or to distinguish between the interests of foreign businesses and local 
actors’ (Respondent 22).  
The Auditor General, for example, has found that ‘Neither the will nor the discipline to make 
reforms is present and even if it was it is only the first step. Reform must be balanced with staff 
competency and there needs to be consequences for failure for all parties…. It’s not enough to 
have laws on the books – they need to be enforced with rigour, consistency and a strong sense of 
justice for all’ (Bah, 2016: vii). Yet so far these reports have not resulted in significant punitive 
action or changes in behaviour. 
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Sierra Leone remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. When commodity prices fell 
sharply, and the Ebola epidemic hit, the country suffered a devastating downturn, 
notwithstanding the increases in official aid transfers during the Ebola period. Some key insights 
of potentially general applicability that emerge from the Sierra Leone case based upon our 
consultative roundtable in Freetown (with respondents 58 to 71) include the following. First, in 
some contexts, a sub-region (such as a Regional Economic Community) may be the better unit of 
BER analysis. With a population of seven million – most of whom live below the poverty line of 
two dollars a day – the domestic market for goods and services in Sierra Leone is small. 
Businesses have therefore concentrated on commercial trading, infrastructure, small service-
sector operations, and production of raw materials for export. The result is growth dependent on 
raw materials exports and a limited number of manufactured products. Yet the Mano River 
Union (MRU), comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, has a combined 
market size of nearly 45 million people (half the size of Ethiopia, and roughly the size of Kenya). 
Second, business interests must be balanced with other social and political interests. 
Incoherence and even contradiction in rules and policies meant to create a favourable business 
environment may also create tensions and even ignite violence at the local level. A case in point 
is the high court judgment in a case brought by a host community, finding that a particular 
mining company is exempt from the payment of all taxes according to the terms of the mining 
agreement between the state and the company. This outcome violated local expectations, 
espoused national policy, and international norms and standards. Third, making BER a priority 
may be contested in a largely informal economy. Over 80% of the population in Sierra Leone 
operates in the informal sector, with most of the labour force underemployed and less than 10% 
of the population having a bank account (UN, 2017). BER efforts to address the formal economy 
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– i.e. officially registered firms which pay taxes to the state – ‘are largely decoupled from the 
livelihoods of the larger populace’ (Respondent 25).  
ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION 
The thematic coding of the interviews (as outlined in our methodology section) investigating the 
nexus between BER and conflict, fragility, and underdevelopment, based upon our country case 
studies, are presented below. These are structured around the discussion of 1) the impact of BER 
programming in terms of transaction costs, competitiveness, broader development, and conflict; 
2) how the sequencing of BER could best be undertaken mindful of the complexities of the local 
political economies; and 3) the implementation of BER and its embedding in the countries’ 
political economies and how it affected the various dimensions raised in point 1. 
Impact of BER 
The interviews demonstrated that whether one considered BER successful or not depended upon 
what one regarded as its primary objectives. If one measures success by a reduction in 
transaction costs, BER interventions such as one-stop shops have had positive results reducing 
transactions costs in some FCAS – e.g. in Rwanda. This connects to the public administration 
literature on ‘pockets of effectiveness’ that can occur in countries that have poor governance and 
weak public sectors and yet produce some well-functioning agencies or systems (Leonard, 2010).  
Results, however, are not uniform, and point to the interplay of even ‘technical’ reforms 
with broader issues of institutional capacity and the political economy. In Uganda, for example, 
the one-stop shop was characterised as ‘one-more stop’ (Respondent 15), as it was unable to 
overcome inertia in sister agencies. Additionally, attempts to facilitate business entry may mask 
underlying problems. Advantages may be preferentially bestowed on foreign investors or 
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politically connected individuals, who get access to this ‘oasis of efficiency’ (Respondent 11). 
Smaller, often domestic, players are not always able to access advantages and have to survive the 
dysfunctional system, increasing their sense of grievance and exclusion. 
BER impact on overall competitiveness in FCAS is similarly inconclusive. Transaction 
costs may not capture broader competitive dynamics of FCAS markets associated with the ‘cost 
of doing business’, which is important for investors. In Uganda, for example, reforms to lower 
transaction costs – like the reduction in registration times for new businesses from 15 to 5 days – 
did not meaningfully change business opportunity for applicants. Additionally, they were 
expensive for the state to implement, and perversely, they ‘resulted in an increase in the 
bureaucracy to implement the change which in turn resulted in even more ethnically-driven 
patronage positions’ (Respondent 11).  
BER impact on inclusive development is not clearly established in FCAS. There is 
limited evidence that BER successes, in and of themselves, impact other developmental 
objectives. Evidence is stronger in Rwanda where BER was part of a broader strategy that 
includes both an efficient state and a vibrant private sector. In such cases, there is a clearer line 
of sight from discrete BER efforts to development outcomes.  
BER performance is mixed with respect to direct and indirect effects of BER on 
economic development and greater inclusivity through the building of social capital. There is 
evidence that BER can act as a catalyst for economic growth (McIntosh & Buckley, 2015). But 
this effect is not universal across implementation contexts. The role of BER to attract FDI is not 
straightforward and other factors seem to be important in that regard (Iammarino, 2018). The 
evidence directly linking BER to socio-development and political outcomes, and to state-
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building and peacebuilding, are contested (see White & Fortune, 2015; McIntosh & Buckley, 
2015) and this was evident amongst our respondents. 
BER may be an altogether less strong lever for greater stability or development in 
extractives economies (Respondent 42). BER is not meaningfully changing the predominance of 
investment in natural resources, such as oil in Uganda or minerals in Sierra Leone. Structural 
change appears to occur primarily through exogenous factors of the global economy that 
determine investment (in Sierra Leone) or disinvestment (in Uganda). BER has not created 
economic opportunities resilient to commodity fluctuations, and the experience of both countries 
suggests that investments in the extractives sector are particularly prone to conflict risks.  
Sequencing of BER  
More effective BER implementation occurred after establishing security, political commitment 
and capabilities to implement reforms. Of the four country case studies, Rwanda has pursued the 
BER agenda most explicitly and integrated it into major facets of its overall development plans. 
It was also one of the early adopters of BER and it therefore provides useful insights on the 
sequencing of reforms and was structured as follows. 
i. ‘Security first’ before major economic plans and reforms. In this case sequencing 
occurred as follows: security first, accompanied by institution building, and then the big 
economic plan and vision with capable implementation and monitoring. The process of 
institution building itself appears to follow its own sequencing which initially focused on 
security and justice, and the provision of basic needs, and then the construction of more 
advanced institutions required to implement more ambitious economic plans. This sequence of 
‘security first before wider institutional reform’ is mirrored by the World Bank (2011: 11-16) 
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and findings by McIntosh and Buckley (2015) that humanitarian interventions and stabilisation 
should come first as they form a basis for further reforms. The sequence is also corroborated by 
respondents interviewed on Rwanda.   
‘Rwanda wanted to be systematic. It first put the institutions in place and then undertook 
the systematic reforms to the business environment. It utilised the Doing Business 
Indicators (DBI) as its framework. … The DBI provided a useful breakdown of what 
needed to be done and allowed them to track the progress which was important. … 
[Specific BER reforms] were done early on were property rights and land titles, and the 
early push for decentralisation … was important for service delivery’ (Respondent 6).  
‘Pre-2000 the focus was on getting the institutions right and focusing on security both 
internally and along the borders. This was also important in the nation-branding process 
as investors needed a new narrative and not to focus on the past but on the future of 
Rwanda. Then putting in the processes for monitoring and evaluation are essential’ 
(Respondent 3). 
ii. Public trust in institutions first before wider institutional reforms. Rwanda also 
highlights the importance of building trust in the state and in its capacity early on, as countries 
emerging out of conflict generally have very low levels of trust and especially low levels of trust 
as regards the state. This finding is corroborated by the World Bank, which asserts that there is a 
need to restore confidence in collective action in FCAS before embarking on wider institutional 
reforms, and that the priority is a transformation of institutions that provide security, justice and 
jobs (World Bank, 2011: 11-16).  
Implementation and political economy of BER 
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Comparative analysis of the case studies suggests a number of promising directions for 
theorizing both the overall anaemic record for BER in FCAS, and the causes of variability in 
impact across markets. These might be characterized as the political economy of BER in FCAS: 
the degree to which it supports a focused and well-supported economic development agenda; the 
degree to which it reinforces negative power relationships and institutional arrangements; 
sensitivity in local implementation; and capacity within both governments and companies. 
The success of BER as a tool for achieving development objectives appears to turn on the 
extent to which it is contextually tailored to advance a focused economic development agenda. 
For example, Ethiopia’s economic and social successes came from its focused package of 
reforms – from extension services to infrastructure to trade facilities – in support of agriculture-
led growth, even as reform efforts in other areas have faced substantial resistance.  
Conversely, respondents noted that when generic application of BER formulas and 
assumptions was the entry point for policy – such as the introduction of commercial courts in 
Sierra Leone or of one-stop shops in Uganda – there was little appetite for real reform or chance 
of meaningful impact. Political economy issues have constrained the implementation of BER 
programmes, which have not always led to outcomes compatible with the objective of inclusive 
development. The very factors that make a context fragile – rent seeking, a tendency to perceive 
and act along well-worn conflict lines, contested power and legitimacy between the centre and 
the periphery, and other drivers of fragility – often undermine attempts to address fragility 
through BER. The economic sphere seems particularly prone to contestation that will reinforce 
rather than ameliorate fragility, for example (Ganson & Wennmann, 2017):  
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• In Rwanda, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, BER was associated to a greater or lesser extent 
with consolidation of economic and political power by a ruling elite, rather than with 
broad-based economic expansion. 
• In Ethiopia, BER was in earlier years associated more directly with benefits to the 
country’s broad base of smallholder farmers, but more recently has been contested as 
government focus shifts towards larger-scale enterprises.  
• In Sierra Leone, conflict over large-scale investment practices – from land allocation to 
lack of prioritisation of local employment to deployment of military and paramilitary 
forces to supress protest – is increasingly evidencing grievances and fault lines that echo 
the run-up to the civil war. 
Additionally, in countries in which up to 80% of the population engages in subsistence 
agriculture, BER is to some extent an elite activity whose benefits accrue disproportionately to 
large players in the formal economy. The land- and resource-hungry enterprises it tends to 
promote, for example in mining or commercial agriculture, bring it into direct conflict with 
farming and pastoral communities whose livelihoods are disrupted (Kandel, 2016). This presents 
a particular challenge to international business which may mean to be part of the solution but end 
up crowding out indigenous enterprise. 
A gap was widely noted between the intent at the national policy level and the reality of 
implementation at the local level. Projects negotiated at the national level may underplay or 
ignore the issues of greatest importance to local communities and traditional paramount chiefs, 
such as land acquisition, creation of local employment and business opportunities, and protection 
from the environmental and social risks associated with large-scale development. Across private-
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sector actors, ‘there is a lack of attention to the context, and a disconnection from how 
companies might be exacerbating tensions, violations, etc. This can lead to very negative ends. 
Companies have a significant impact on existing power structures, but they rarely think in this 
way’ (Respondent 31). This underlines the potential of BER to in practice contribute to the 
exacerbation of centre-periphery tensions between different levels of government and between 
formal and traditional authorities (Ganson & Wennmann, 2017). Respondents noted better 
results when companies invest more heavily in understanding the context, building relationships, 
and in some cases, engaging third party neutrals to help mediate socio-political conflicts related 
to BER and broader economic reform efforts.  
The thematic analysis of our results point to the complexities and limitations of a linear 
approach to BER. We show that BER was itself the product of a highly contested and conflictual 
political economy. Conflict in the FCAS political economy was characterized by chronic 
tensions between ethnic or political groups, between the formal and informal states, between 
national and regional or local actors, or between actors in competing economic activities. Given 
the weakness of formal institutions, this led to the exercise of largely informal but highly partisan 
informal control over the levers of markets and the economy. To the extent that formal 
institutions were relevant, they also came under partisan control. Resulting market developments 
typically increased horizontal inequalities across these conflict divides (Stewart, 2008), while 
having marginal impacts on human development at either local or national levels. Within this 
dominant system, rule-driven BER was a relatively bit player in the shaping of FCAS economies 
and the distribution of costs, risks, and benefits within them, compared to the levers of informal 
and formal control available to powerful partisan actors in places such as Sierra Leone and 
Uganda. To the extent that BER had a discernible impact on markets and their impact on human 
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development and horizontal inequalities underlying conflict, they tended to mimic and reinforce 
the dominant political economy of conflict, rather than change them.  
CONCLUSION 
The four cases studies presented here demonstrate the various ways in which BER and 
related investment promotion efforts have in some cases exacerbated drivers of conflict and 
undermined development goals, from the project level (e.g., lack of prioritization of local 
employment in Sierra Leone) to the national policy arena (e.g., Ethiopia’s shift in focus towards 
commercial agriculture that fuels deeply-rooted conflicts over land and participation in national 
decision-making).  These are consistent with evidence that confrontations among companies, 
communities and governments in fragile states have been growing in number and intensity as 
investment flows increase (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016), and that BER may under some 
circumstances privilege foreign business interests at the expense of social progress (Barbara, 
2006), putting market reform efforts in tension with the SDGs. How MNEs can be part of the 
solution and contribute towards meaningful development and conflict resolution, mindful of 
potential trade-offs, is an important area for further research (van Zanten & van Tulder, 2018). 
Together, these questions begin to frame an overarching theoretical framework for BER 
in FCAS. It appears that BER has the greatest potential to advance achievement of the SDGs 
when it is attentive to three objectives at the same time: stimulating broad-based economic 
growth, expanding economic opportunity in formal and informal markets, and addressing drivers 
of conflict and fragility. When BER focuses predominantly on economic growth as an end 
outcome, it risks contributing to perverse impacts and fails as a policy instrument to foster 
inclusive development. In Uganda, for example, BER largely ignores the majority of the 
population that lives from subsistence farming or works in the informal sector, missing 
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opportunities for more broad-based impact. In Sierra Leone, growth- and tax-revenue oriented 
initiatives in mining and commercial agriculture seem blind to growing conflict risks from 
displacement of local communities. In Rwanda, conversely, there seemed to be a firmer 
understanding of the nexus of a well-functioning state and the delivery of economic outcomes to 
a broad-based constituency.  
BER can be part of a broader development plan for FCAS but this requires a move away 
from linear, transactional approaches towards an emergent, systems-based approach that 
recognizes the complex network of interconnected and interacting business interests, agendas, 
and systems in FCAS. This systems approach is aligned with the work on macromarkets that 
identifies that growth and development are affected by marketing systems that are ‘multilayered, 
multiagent, multiparticipatory’ (Layton, 2009: 355) and are ‘resistant to piecemeal interventions’ 
(Schultz et al., 2012:182). In FCAS contexts, a more nuanced understanding of BER as a 
negotiated settlement of economic conflicts – rather than as a set of market-defining rules – 
opens both understanding of why BER often fails in FCAS, and how it could better succeed. 
Figure 1 illustrates our systems framework, which accepts processes of emergence and co-
evolution through iteration and feedback loops.  
In FCAS environments, the goal of economic growth should be a means to two ends: 
increased human development, and decreased horizontal inequalities underpinning conflict in the 
political economy. Within this framework, consensus-based BER is the balancing of competing 
dualities. The first relate to the exercise of power: between formal and traditional authorities, 
between national and regional governments, or between executive and legislative branches. The 
second relate to the prioritization of BER for human development: in the FCAS context in 
particular, the directness of benefit to smallholders and subsistence farmers, the benefits to the 
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urban poor, and the benefits to women.  The third relate to the impact of BER on horizontal 
inequalities: between those in the formal and in the informal economies, between urban and rural 
populations, and between different regions, particularly where these are politically or ethnically 
defined (Luiz, 2015). 
Where advocates for market reforms can account for, balance and reach sufficient consensus 
on the distribution of costs, risks and benefits of BER efforts across these three dimensions, 
reforms may not only cease to be undermined by the partisanship in the exercise of formal and 
informal levers of control over market impacts, but may even contribute to their reduction. This 
creates positive feedback loops in the system that, at the same time, allow markets to grow, 
human development to accelerate, and horizontal inequalities underpinning the political economy 
of conflict to be reduced. 
Insert figure 1 
Implications 
For BER to accelerate the achievement of the SDGs and SDG 16 in particular, BER and 
related market reform efforts must not only claim to advance the SDGs, but must more faithfully 
mirror the underlying principles of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Moving in 
that direction includes policy and research efforts more attentive to the following. First, a people-
centred approach to BER in FCAS; which means BER programmes designed from the 
perspective of the people a programme intends to assist. Second, a multi-dimensional approach 
that goes beyond the limited focus on economic growth and towards a holistic approach to 
private sector investment with its impact – both positive and negative – on the systems that 
define conflict and fragility. Third, BER needs to be consensus building for the implementation 
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of reforms. Rather than focusing on pacts between international institutions and governing elites, 
BER might better focus on supporting platforms for discovery, collaborative analysis and 
planning, as well as new coalitions in support of inclusive development. Only then will BER 
likely be able to play its highest and best role as a disciplining mechanism for macroeconomic 
stability and for strengthening market accountability and efficiency in ways that more 
dependably advance the SDGs. 
Lastly, the implications for international businesses entering or operating in FCAS are 
substantial. In order to contribute towards the achievement of broad development in FCAS, they 
must shift from a transactional to a transformative, systems approach which leverages 
meaningful relationships with stakeholders and is deeply embedded in the local context (George 
et al., 2016; Hanekom & Luiz, 2017; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Recognizing that businesses 
are not only institution takers but impact significantly on local institutions (Luiz & Stewart, 
2014; Witte et al., 2017), they must make the systemic BER agenda central to their organisations 
(Howard-Grenville & Hoffman, 2003). This may in turn require development of new and 
atypical capabilities to navigate FCAS dynamics.  
Limitations and areas for future research 
Given the complexity of FCAS we are aware that our study is exploratory in nature and that 
there are limitations attached to the selection of the four countries, and the sample of 
interviewees. We have not surveyed individuals at a more micro level but that was not our 
intention and our sample was composed of senior people that cut across business, government, 
civil society, NGOs, activists, and academics, and various farming and business associations 
bringing in multiple perspectives. 
35 
 
The paper raises important areas for further research. First, is the relationship of BER to the 
informal economy (Luiz, Kachika, & Kudzurunga, 2019). In Africa, more than half of GDP and 
more than 80% of the labour force are tied to the informal sector (in which most workers are 
women and youth) (World Bank, 2018a). So BER risks being irrelevant to much of the economy, 
particularly those parts affecting the most vulnerable parts of the population. Also, when 
governments (and international partners) prioritise formalisation as a driver of development, they 
risk perverse impacts. How international business promotion and foreign business attraction can 
contribute towards the development of informal economies and indigenous livelihoods and not 
crowd out these activities is important if multinationals and international business are going to 
contribute towards poverty alleviation, as has been called for previously in this journal (Kolk, 
Rivera-Santos, & Rufín, 2018). 
Second, the case studies point towards a need to further examine impacts of BER on 
consolidation or dispersion of power and whether it further entrenches elite interests at the 
expense of broad-based development. All of the case study countries are characterised by 
‘closed’ access orders, patronage, and rent-seeking in key sectors (North et al., 2009). Given 
their exclusive nature, such orders will not spontaneously provide a sufficient degree of justice 
and inclusion, but may rather further marginalize excluded communities (Oberland, 2014).  
Third, the SDGs underline the need for international investors to be conflict sensitive -
understanding the interactions of their presence and operations with key drivers of conflict and 
fragility – if they are to contribute to peaceful development and inclusive societies (SDG 16). 
Yet this does not always translate to the international business policy level. For example, in the 
case studies with large extractive sectors, interviewees suggested that a significant by-product of 
the intense wave of foreign investment was conflict. For instance, in Uganda, they highlight how 
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land reform gave government a mandate to take over land from indigenous people for the 
purpose of giving it to foreign business for commercial purposes, triggering violence on the 
ground. At the same time, tens of thousands of Ugandans migrated to oil producing areas in 
search of economic opportunities even before any meaningful number of new jobs were created, 
undermining arguments that job creation would spur development. As new sources of conflict 
and fragility – e.g., population pressures, climate change and rapid urbanisation – further 
increase pressures on existing political and social systems (Nørby Bonde & Wennmann, 2015), it 
appears particularly critical that the interplay between BER initiatives and these dynamics be 
understood and addressed, systematically integrating conflict-sensitivity and political economy 
awareness into BER planning and implementation. 
As regards the international business policy agenda, our research has implications for the five 
policy areas identified by this journal, namely international business promotion, foreign business 
attraction, industrial policy, social and development policy, and transnational governance. What 
we have highlighted is the potential trade-offs between the first three areas (which are central to 
BER) and the fourth, and that this is magnified in the context of FCAS. How we reconcile these 
tensions and bring them to the fore within the international business policy agenda, and how this 
is enacted in future transnational governance agreements, is central going forward. 
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Table 1: List of respondents and participants 
Respondent# Interviewee Country 
Semi-Structured Interviews: Respondents  
1 International Development Agency, Rwanda Senior 
Director 
Rwanda 
2 Professor of Political Studies and specialist in 
development assistance in Africa, and Rwanda  
Canada 
3 Senior Manager, Rwanda government agency 
responsible for BER 
Rwanda 
4 Country Director of a social innovation centre, lawyer, 
and gender expert 
Rwanda 
5 Professor of Economics, Rwanda Rwanda 
6 Senior Manager in Rwanda, Multilateral Finance 
Institution 
Rwanda 
7 Professor of Management, Rwanda  Rwanda 
8 Leading international scholar on Rwanda, Professor of 
Law and Politics 
Belgium 
9 Senior Manager at a development agency, Rwanda Rwanda 
10 Research Director at an international centre for tax 
focused on Africa 
United Kingdom 
11 Executive director, NGO Uganda Uganda 
12 NGO programme manager, Uganda Uganda 
13 Public policy advisor, mediator, environmentalist 
Uganda 
Uganda 
14 International development agency, Uganda Uganda 
15 CEO financial sector, Uganda Uganda 
16 International development donor, Uganda Uganda 
17 Macroeconomic analyst, Uganda Uganda 
18 Trade analyst, Uganda Uganda 
19 University academic, Ethiopia Ethiopia 
20 Senior Manager, Multilateral Financial Institution, 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
21 Director, NGO Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
22 Managing Director, NGO Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
23 Manager Multinational Corporation, Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
24 Director, government agency, Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
25 Academic expert, Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
26 Senior Development Specialist, Multilateral Financial 
Institution headquarters 
USA 
27 Director, consulting agency in development United Kingdom 
28 Manager, Fragile and Conflict Situations Africa, 
Multilateral Financial Institution 
Kenya 
29 Senior Programme Officer, UN Agency Ethiopia 
30 CEO: International mining agency United Kingdom 
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31 Managing Director, development agency  USA 
32 CEO: development agency United Kingdom 
33 Head of Sustainability: Multinational Corporation East 
Africa 
Tanzania 
34 Senior Researcher: development think tank United Kingdom 
35 Director of Corporate Responsibility, mining company Mexico 
36 Partner: Multinational law firm France 
37 Senior Extractives Advisor, UN agency Switzerland 
38 Stakeholder Affairs Director: Multinational Corporation Germany 
39 Associate Director, International Development Advisory 
Services - big four consulting firm 
Kenya 
40 Assembly Member International NGO and Chairman of 
Multinational Corporation 
Switzerland 
41 International NGO Manager  China 
42 Independent advisor on energy in Africa USA 
Roundtable participant  
43 Academic on Peace and Conflict Studies, Uganda Uganda 
44 CEO of institute on governance, Uganda Uganda 
45 Africa Director: International NGO Uganda 
46 Previously CEO of a financial regulator Uganda Uganda 
47 Trade Analyst at a think tank in Uganda Uganda 
48 Head of Research and Advocacy in Ugandan NGO Uganda 
49 Executive Director Uganda: international NGO Uganda 
50 Director Advisory: big four consulting firm Uganda 
51 Research Fellow, Ugandan university Uganda 
52 Partner: major law firm Uganda Uganda 
53 Programme Director: NGO Uganda 
54 Executive Director: International NGO Uganda 
55 Senior manager: International NGO Uganda 
56 Senior manager : International NGO Uganda 
57 Senior manager: Ugandan financial agency Uganda 
58 Senior manager, business association Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
59 Senior manager: regional development financial 
institution Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone 
60 Country representative Sierra Leone: international 
financial institution 
Sierra Leone 
61 Senior manager Sierra Leone: international NGO Sierra Leone 
62 Independent consultant on development in Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
63 Senior manager: government agency Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
64 Senior manager Sierra Leone: Multilateral Financial 
Institution 
Sierra Leone 
65 Senior researcher: academic development institute Sierra Leone 
66 Senior researcher: academic development institute Sierra Leone 
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67 Senior partner Sierra Leone: big four consulting firm Sierra Leone 
68 Senior researcher: academic development institute Sierra Leone 
69 Director: development institute in Africa Sierra Leone 
70 Senior manager: Multinational Corporation Sierra Leone 
71 Senior researcher: academic development institute Sierra Leone 
72 Head of development policy: big four consulting firm Sierra Leone 
73 Manager of development policy: big four consulting 
firm 
Sierra Leone 
74 Senior manager: international donor agency United Kingdom 
75 Senior manager: international donor agency United Kingdom 
76 Programme manager: international donor agency United Kingdom 
77 Programme manager: international donor agency United Kingdom 
78 Programme manager: international donor agency United Kingdom 
79 Programme manager: international donor agency United Kingdom 
80 Consultant: International development United Kingdom 
81 Consultant: International development United Kingdom 
82 Director: Government agency in international 
development 
United Kingdom 




Table 2: Country socio-economic data (2016) 
 Ethiopia Rwanda Sierra Leone Uganda 
Population 99.4m 11.6m 6.5m 39m 
GDP (current US$) 73bn 8.5bn 3.5bn 24.1bn 
GNI per capita $ 1730 1870 1320 1820 
Agriculture % GDP 36 35 71 25 
EAP Population in agriculture 83 90 60 72 
% in poverty 87.3 53.8 81 69.9 
Global Hunger Index 33.4 (serious) 27.4 (serious) 35 (alarming) 26.4 (serious) 
Violent deaths per 100,000 
(average p.a. 2010-2015) 
9.3 4.6 2.2 11.4 
Doing business indicator (100 
being best performance) 
47.25 69.81 50.23 57.77 
Access to electricity, urban (% 
of urban population) 
85.4 80.0 46.9 57.5 
Access to electricity, rural (% 
of rural population) 
26.5 17.8 2.5 18.0 
Fertility rate, total (births per 
woman) 
4.2 3.9 4.5 5.6 
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
5.5 3.1 3.9 2.6 
Gross capital formation (% of 
GDP) 
38.0 25.3 20.1 25.5 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
7.3 7.2 10.9 5.7 
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years) 
65.5 67.1 51.8 59.9 
Military expenditure (% of 
general government 
expenditure) 
3.6 4.9 3.4 10.9 









































Figure 1: A systems-based approach to BER in FCAS 
Notes: HD - human development; HE - horizontal equality 
